I INTRODUCTION
Embedded in the pavement of Martin Place between Phillip Street and Macquarie Street in what is now the central business district of Sydney are rectangular metal grilles. Periodically, they emit walls of mist in the shape of Georgian cottages which once stood there. Next to them are bronze bowls representing washrooms once fed by the Tank Stream.
Not far from the site of that installation, on the Elizabeth Street side of Phillip Street where it now meets Martin Place, there once stood a Victorian terrace in which Robert Randolph Garran was born on 10 February 1867. His father, Andrew Garran, was then a journalist with, and was later editor of, the Sydney Morning Herald. His mother, Mary Isham Garran, had a deep social conscience and later served on the board of the Sydney Children's Hospital. She also had a deep distrust of milkman's milk. The family kept a cow on the Domain. The cow would wander across Macquarie Street to the backyard of the house in Phillip Street to be milked twice a day. The young Robert Garran grew up happily in a household with five older sisters. So tall did he become, standing at 6' 4'' in an age when the average height for an adult male was considerably shorter than it is * Justice of the High Court of Australia. This is a revised version of the Geoffrey Sawer Lecture delivered at the Australian National University on 12 October 2017. I thank Natalie Burgess and Glyn Ayres for their research and Jane Reynolds for bringing to my attention the fact that 2017 was the 150 th anniversary of Sir Robert Garran's birth. our national development. In his preface to Prosper the Commonwealth, Garran recalled a visit to Sydney in his youth by a French comedy company. The company included in its repertoire a comedy the title of which translated to 'The Voyage of Mr Perrichon'. Perrichon was a pretentious simpleton who treated himself and his family to a tour in Switzerland. At a hotel, he was approached by a painter with a proposal to paint his portrait with Mont Blanc in the background. The Frenchman, according to Garran, was charmed with the idea, but insisted on 'a very little Mont Blanc, and an enormous Perrichon'. Garran expressed the hope that the result of the writing of his memoir was 'not too much Perrichon and too little Mont Blanc'. 14 He need not have been concerned about the proportions. Sir Kenneth Bailey, who was a successor to Garran in the offices both of Secretary of the Attorney-General's Department and of Solicitor-General of the Commonwealth, recorded soon after Garran's death: 'It is hard to write about Sir Robert Garran otherwise than in superlatives. There was in fact nothing 'average' about him. In ability, in character, in attainments, even in length of body and of life, he was altogether exceptional'. 15 Amongst the characteristics which Bailey ascribed to Garran were 'a sense of proportion and moderation, a capacity for enthusiasm without fanaticism, for fellowship without loss of dignity and reserve'. 16 Bailey awaited Garran's memoir, then still to be published, as 'the reflections of a wise, mellow and distinguished old man upon great times, in so many leading events of which he had himself been not only witness but participant'. 17 Writing around the same time, Sawer described Garran in similarly superlative and affectionate terms. 'The Commonwealth', said Sawer, was fortunate in having through so much of its early history the services of such a mansuperbly intelligent, with great practical commonsense, a Christian both in moral rectitude and in loving-kindness, selfless, devoid of any faintest touch of arrogance, priggishness or conceit, with a sense both of humour and of fun. 18 Bailey and Sawer each wrote that Garran's life could be seen to have had four distinct phases. 19 The first was the period of his formation in the years to 1890. The second was the period of constitution-making between 1890 and 1900. The third was the period of 31 years between 1901 and 1932 which he spent as Secretary of the Attorney-General's Department. The last was the further period of nearly 25 years which he spent productively in retirement contributing to the intellectual and social life of Canberra.
I will touch on one important but often neglected aspect of the second of those periods before concentrating on the third. I will then turn to Garran's later reflections on the nature and practice of constitutional law.
II THE POPULAR MOVEMENT
The aspect of constitution-making on which I want to touch featured prominently in Garran's own writing on the federation movement. 20 It has received some attention in the writings of constitutional historians, 21 but it has not featured prominently in mainstream writings on constitutional law. 22 It concerns not the well-documented proceedings of the Australasian Federation Conference of 1890, of the National Australasian Convention of 1891, or even of the Australasian Federal Convention of 1897 and 1898. Nor does it concern the successive drafts of the Constitution which emanated from those Conventions, including those which emanated from the Convention of 1897 and 1898 in which Garran as Secretary to the Drafting Committee was intimately involved. It concerns rather what Garran described as the 'popular movement' during the period between 1891 and 1897 when, in Garran's words, having been '[l]eft for dead by the politicians, federation was brought to life by the people'. 23 The Conference of 1890 had been primarily a conference of colonial Premiers. The Convention of 1891 had been a conference of delegates of colonial Parliaments. The holding of the Conference of 1890 and the Convention of 1891 had owed much to the political drive of Sir Henry Parkes. The Convention of 1891 had produced a complete draft of an Australian Constitution, attributable in large part to the technical expertise of Sir Samuel Griffith. But after the Convention came what Garran described as the '[d]oldrums'. 24 The 1891 draft of the Constitution 'had been born helpless into a world busy with other affairs, and had been left to the accidents and delays of political opportunity'. 25 To become law, the Constitution needed to be enacted by the Imperial Parliament. But no mechanism had been established by which that was to be achieved. Parkes' energy and political influence waned after 1891, and colonial Parliaments became distracted with local issues.
Parkes' 'mantle', as Garran put it, in those circumstances fell on the shoulders of Barton. Garran described Barton as 'a very "clubable" man … not easily roused to 20 23 Garran, Prosper the Commonwealth, above n 7, 101. 24 Ibid 99. 25 Garran, 'The Federation Movement and the Founding of the Commonwealth', above n 20, 439.
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Volume 46 _____________________________________________________________________________________ exertion except in something in which he had an interest', 26 who 'found that interest in the idea of Australian union, and threw himself into the cause with amazing energy'. 27 Barton was no stranger to colonial political office. He was briefly Attorney-General of New South Wales but he chose to pursue the cause of federation as an outsider. Increasing agitation in Victoria from the Australian Natives' Association and formation of Federation Leagues in New South Wales, especially in the Riverina, prompted Barton to convene a public meeting at Sydney Town Hall at the beginning of July 1893, the result of which was the formation of an Australasian Federation League. 28 On the last day of that same month, July 1893, a Conference of the Australian Natives' Association and the various Federation Leagues was convened in Corowa at which 74 delegates attended. 29 It was at the Corowa Conference that the older and more ponderous Quick, who was representing the Bendigo branch of the Australian Natives' Association, first met the younger and more nimble Garran, who was representing the Sydney branch of the Australasian Federation League. 30 On the second day of the Corowa Conference, Tuesday, 1 August 1893, Quick moved a long-winded motion which attempted to encapsulate the aim of the Conference. 31 The motion was to the effect that the Conference should resolve to establish a non-party Australia-wide league to encourage formation within each of the colonies of a Federation Party. To that motion, according to Garran, came an exasperated cry from another delegate of 'Words, words, words-can't we do something?', to which there was a chorus of approval. 32 Quick sought a short adjournment, the result of which was the formulation within half an hour of a resolution which came to be passed in the following terms:
That in the opinion of this Conference the Legislature of each Australasian colony should pass an Act providing for the election of representatives to attend a statutory convention or congress to consider and adopt a bill to establish a Federal Constitution for Australia and upon the adoption of such bill or measure it be submitted by some process of referendum to the verdict of each colony. 33 Quick was not quick. Garran would come later to be weighed down by the tedious and laborious process of their co-authorship of The Annotated Constitution of the Australian Commonwealth, in which he likened his role to that of junior partner of a steamroller. 34 Garran would forever-after be a little embarrassed by the bulkiness of the result of their joint labours. His copy of the book, he said, he found useful as a doorstop. 35 But in that half hour in Corowa on 1 August 1893, Garran credits Quick with having come up with the essential elements of the plan by which the Australian people would 26 Garran, 'Constitution Building', above n 4, 193. 27 Garran, Prosper the Commonwealth, above n 7, 101. 28 Ibid 102. 29 Official Report of the Federation Conference, Corowa, 31 July and 1 August 1893. 30 Garran, Prosper the Commonwealth, above n 7, 136; Helen Irving, 'When Quick Met Garran:
The Corowa Plan' (1998) 32 Papers on Parliament (Department of the Senate, Canberra) 13, 19. 31 Garran, Prosper the Commonwealth, above n 7, 102-3. See Official Report of the Federation Conference, above n 299, 32-3. 32 Garran, Prosper the Commonwealth, above n 7, 103. 33 Ibid. See Official Report of the Federation Conference, above n 299, 37. 34 Garran, Prosper the Commonwealth, above n 7, 137. 35 Garran, 'Constitution Building', above n 4, 188.
ultimately propel the Australian continent to a single political entity. 36 The detail of the 'Corowa Plan' was filled in by Quick on his return to Bendigo in the form of an Australasian Federal Congress Bill which was adopted by the Australasian Federation League and published in 1894. 37 In November 1894, a delegation from the Australasian Federation League put a version of the Corowa Plan to George Reid, who had become Premier of New South Wales following a general election three months before. 38 Reid, as Garran described him, was at that time a lawyer-politician 'whose devotion to free trade left little room for the intrusion of other ideas' 39 and who proudly kept 'a complete set of Herbert Spencer in his [c]hambers among his law-books'. 40 Reid had no enthusiasm for federation and his legacy would come later to be tainted by the sobriquet 'Yes-No Reid' for his ambivalence. 41 But '[t]he people were evidently on the march under Barton's banner, and Reid saw his leadership in New South Wales threatened'. 42 Reid declared that he was impressed by the plan and promised to put it to a Premier's Conference. 43 That he did, in Hobart in January 1895, at which it was agreed. 44 The result was the eventual enactment by the Parliaments of each of the participating colonies of Federation Enabling Acts which had built into them from the outset a mechanism which would see federation carried forward, if at all, by a single and continuous democratic process. 45 In all colonies except Queensland (which did not pass an Enabling Act until 1899), 46 that process involved: the election by electors (or, in the case of Western Australia, by Members of Parliament from a pool of persons nominated by electors) of a representative Convention; the framing by that Convention of a Constitution in the form of a Bill for enactment by the Imperial Parliament; an 36 
Volume 46 _____________________________________________________________________________________ adjournment of the Convention, after it had framed a draft Constitution, so as to give the Parliaments of the colonies an opportunity to consider the draft and to make suggestions which were then to be considered by the Convention before it produced the final version; submission of the final version of the Constitution as soon as practicable after the close of the proceedings of the Convention for acceptance or rejection by a majority of electors in referenda in each colony; and, if accepted by majorities of electors in referenda in three of the colonies, transmission of the Constitution to the Queen by an address from the Parliaments of those colonies praying for its enactment by the Imperial Parliament.
The Convention of 1897 and 1898, the subsequent referenda of 1898, 1899 and 1900, and the transmission of the Australian Constitution for enactment by the Imperial Parliament in 1900, followed with only minor disturbances in the trajectory which had been set by the Federation Enabling Acts. They were the outworking of the Corowa Plan. The democratic spirit of the Corowa Plan was further reflected within the affirmation in the preliminary resolution of the Convention of 1897, which Garran attributed to the suggestion of Bernhard Wise. The resolution affirmed that the purpose of creating a 'federal Government' was 'to enlarge the powers of self-government of the people of Australia'. 47 As Garran explained it:
This happy phrase of Wise's directed attention to the fact that the individual citizen would surrender nothing. All that was withdrawn from his local citizenship would be handed back to him, enlarged and more effective, in the gift of a new Commonwealth citizenship, by virtue of which his national affairs were transferred to a national plane. 48 The opening words of the preamble to the Imperial Act for the Australian Constitution as it emerged from the Convention of 1897 and 1898 and as it came to be enacted by the Imperial Parliament-'Whereas the people [of the colonies which have adopted the Constitution] have agreed to unite in one indissoluble Federal Commonwealth'-were explained in Quick and Garran's annotations to have flowed directly from the mode of assent for which provision was made in the Federation Enabling Acts. 49 The words contrast markedly with the preamble to the draft Constitution as it had emerged from the Convention of 1891 which began 'Whereas the Australasian colonies [which have adopted the Constitution] have … agreed to unite in one Federal Commonwealth'. 50 The words also contrast favourably in their historical accuracy with the stirring but abstracted and metaphorical 'We the people' of the United States Constitution. What the enacted words proclaim, as Quick and Garran fairly summed them up in 1901 in terms which have striking contemporary resonance, is 'that the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia is founded on the will of the people whom it is designed to unite and govern ' 
III THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S DEPARTMENT
What can now be assessed with some confidence is the contribution Garran made to constitutional development as an Australian government lawyer. The AttorneyGeneral's Department, of which Garran was for a time both 'the head and the tail', was throughout his term as its Secretary deliberately kept by him as a small professional department with minimal administrative responsibilities, having as its principal functions the giving of legal advice to other Departments of the Commonwealth, the drafting of Commonwealth statutes and statutory rules, and the conduct of litigation in which the Commonwealth might be involved. 59 Harry Frederick Ernest Whitlam, father of Gough Whitlam, who joined the AttorneyGeneral's Department in 1913 and who remained under Garran's leadership for the next two decades, provided this description of Garran's decision-making style:
In the less complex matters, so long as one was thoroughly prepared with the ascertainable facts, and was able to present them concisely and in their proper relation and proportion and indicate the contingencies-and this was what he would expect-his conclusion was unhesitating and decisive. In the more complex matters, where principles were involved which required discussion, the discussion was free, subject only, of course, to the limits of relevance; there was, on his part, no restriction to orthodoxies or conventional thinking but a hospitality to all ideas that might have a bearing on the problem in hand, an enlightened weighing of pros and cons, and a firm choice of the course to be pursued. Never could it be said of him that he was legalistic in his views in the sense of being ultra-formal, ultralogical, or narrow in conception or construction. Such discussions did not result in imposed decisions; rather they were the confident movement of thought under instinctive and 52 Bailey, above n 2. 53 Garran, Prosper the Commonwealth, above n 7, ch XVIII. 54 Ibid ch XIX. 55 Ibid ch XXI. 56 Ibid 323. 57 Statute of Westminster 1931 (UK). 58 Statute of Westminster Adoption Act 1942 (Cth). 59 Garran, Prosper the Commonwealth, above n 7, ch XII.
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Volume 46 _____________________________________________________________________________________ sympathetic leadership to reasoned conclusions, acceptable to all engaged in the discussions. 60 It was Garran who, as the first Parliamentary Draftsman, opened the Commonwealth statute book. 61 Together with Gordon Harwood Castle, he established the initial style of Commonwealth legislative drafting which persisted throughout his tenure and until well after his retirement. His aim from the outset was to 'set an example of clear, straightforward language, free from technical jargon'. 62 He set his face against what he described as 'the practice dear to earlier draftsmen of never mentioning a horse without adding mare, foal, colt, filly, or gelding'. 63 No word in a Commonwealth statute was to be superfluous.
Garran admitted that the minimalist style was on occasions carried too far, and he accepted in good humour O'Connor J's parody of the style as follows:
Every man shall wear-(a) Coat (b) Vest (c) Trousers Penalty: £100. 64 To look at early Commonwealth statutes for the drafting of which Garran was primarily responsible is, however, to see precision of thought reflected in economy of language leaving admirably little scope for ambiguity. The Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) (which he styled as an Act 'for the interpretation of Acts of Parliament, and for shortening their language'), the Audit Act 1901 (Cth), the Customs Act 1901 (Cth), the Commonwealth Public Service Act 1902 (Cth), the Commonwealth Franchise Act 1902 (Cth), and the Claims against the Commonwealth Act 1902 (Cth) are amongst the numerous statutes establishing the machinery and laying out the responsibilities of the various components of the national government which were primarily the product of his hand. 'When war expenditure compelled the Commonwealth to resort to direct taxation', Garran became the principal author of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1915 (Cth) which in its original form was, as he playfully put it in his own assessment, 'a thing of beauty and simplicity that would not have shamed Wordsworth or TS Eliot'. 65 The Commonwealth statute book aside, Bailey was undoubtedly correct in suggesting that 'the greater part of Garran's contribution to the actual development of Australian public law will always remain in the confidential files of many Departments of State and in the Opinion Book of his own Department'. 66 Bailey was referring to the advisory function of the Attorney-General's Department, the importance of which _____________________________________________________________________________________ Garran had emphasised to Deakin in a report Garran had prepared for Deakin in 1903. What Garran had then said was this:
The Federal relation involves a most intricate apportionment of constitutional powers and duties between the Commonwealth and State Governments; and in the administration of the Federal Departments, no less than in the drafting of legislative measures, questions of the utmost nicety and importance, of a kind which have never before had to be dealt with in the separate colonies, will continually arise … A vast mass of American and Canadian authorities bear upon these questions, but the Constitution of the Commonwealth is so different, in principle and details, from the Constitution of the United States, or of the Dominion of Canada, that a code of interpretation for the Australian Constitution must inevitably arise. It is the province of the Attorney-General's Department to advise all the Departments on questions of this kind, and to lay down the lines of a sound and consistent interpretation of Federal rights, responsibilities, and duties. 67 Sir John Latham would later describe Deakin, 'though a barrister', as 'a statesman rather than either a practising or an academic lawyer'. 68 Deakin was also a clear and creative thinker and a gifted writer. Garran recalled in his memoir his pleasure in working with Deakin on difficult opinions. Garran would prepare a draft. Deakin would play the role of opposing counsel, attacking it from every side. Garran would rewrite it. 'The rewritten opinion,' recorded Garran, 'with the joints mended where he had pierced them, might reach the same conclusions, but would be more satisfying to [himself] 69 Together, Garran and Deakin produced in the first three years after the establishment of the Commonwealth some of the most elegant, profound and enduring expositions of the interpretation and application of the Australian Constitution ever to have been penned. Anticipating the decision of the High Court in R v Burgess in 1936, 70 they advised on 28 May 1901 that the external affairs power of the Commonwealth Parliament 'is ample to cover adherence to treaties and all matters in connection with them'. 71 Anticipating the decision of the High Court in Cowburn's Case in 1926, 72 they advised on 4 June 1902 that a State law was 'inconsistent' with a Commonwealth law within the meaning of s 109 of the Constitution when the 'evident intention' of the Commonwealth law was to 'supersede' the State law and 'regulate itself the whole subject-matter' of the State law. 73 On 12 November 1902, in an opinion subsequently tabled in the Commonwealth Parliament 74 which was to become known as 'the Vondel opinion' and which was to establish the practice followed thereafter, 75 they advised that the proper channel of communication with the Imperial Government in matters affecting external affairs was the Commonwealth Government and not a State Government. 76 In
Volume 46 _____________________________________________________________________________________ so doing, they expressed the view, taken up by Mason J in the Australian Assistance Plan Case in 1975 77 and commonly assumed into the 21 st century, 78 that '[i]t is impossible to resist the conclusion that the Commonwealth has executive power, independently of Commonwealth legislation, with respect to every matter to which its legislative power extends'. 79 The more significant opinions of Attorneys-General under whom Garran served, as well as the more significant opinions which Garran authored alone, have now been published. 80 Collectively, they bear out Bailey's description of Garran that:
His advice, always enviably well expressed, was never conceived in any negative, narrow or pedantic spirit. His learning was always put to essential constructive ends. History, for him, provided a key to the explanation of the present, but did not confine the future to the limits of the past. 81 More important, perhaps, than any individual opinion was the system of opiniongiving established by Garran to which Bailey alluded in his reference to the 'Opinion Book' of the Attorney-General's Department. The system was still in existence when I was an officer of the Department between 1985 and 1990. The system was that all significant advice was reduced to writing and copies of all written advice were retained within the Department, where they were bound in chronological order and indexed by author and subject-matter. The Opinion Book, which by the time I joined the Department had grown to resemble a series of law reports and was housed in the 'Opinions Room', was treated as an internal system of precedent. A view expressed in an earlier opinion would be adhered to in a later opinion unless departed from, for good reason, by an author of equivalent or higher status. The system contributed to the continuing fulfilment of Garran's goal of the Department which he founded providing sound and consistent interpretation of the rights, responsibilities and duties of the Commonwealth.
IV REFLECTIONS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
In an occasional lecture he gave at Parliament House in 2005, Professor Zines recounted a story told to him by Sawer about being asked to come to see Garran when ill in bed not long before he died. 82 Garran had just read some articles in the journal The Listener about a school of legal theory known as American Legal Realism and he wanted to discuss its ramifications.
Garran had evidently become exposed at that late time in his life to some of the more extreme views of Jerome Frank. Frank, opined Garran in the concluding pages of his memoir, was a theorist who spoilt his case by overstatement. 83 But Garran was evidently captivated. Garran's own ideas about constitutional law, by that time, were not markedly different from Frank's more mature, more moderate and more constructive contemporary, Karl Llewellyn, 84 whom Garran unfortunately had no opportunity to read.
Garran wrote in his memoir that law was 'the sublimation of common sense'. 85 He emphasised the need for the Constitution to 'be able to develop to meet the changing needs of the community' lest it 'cramp the growth of the community till breaking-point is reached'. 86 One of the ways in which the Constitution could adapt itself to the changing conditions of the body politic, Garran had by then long maintained, 87 was by the process of judicial decision. In that context, he wrote that ' [l] aw is an applied science, not an abstract one, and its detailed application to particular cases, especially under new conditions not contemplated by the draftsman, necessarily involves amplification which is indistinguishable from alteration'. 88 He added:
Nor are courts and judges the only interpreters. Every public officer, every citizen, has daily to interpret the law for himself, and the common consent of the community over a long period of time can establish a practice and a tradition which may act as a gloss on the text of the Constitution and carry weight with its authentic interpreters. 89 Too often in the course of Australia's early national development, Garran thought, constitutional law had been approached with an 'ultra-legalistic attitude' and from 'too academic a point of view'. 90 With him, it was 'an article of faith … that there is nothing in the Constitution or in its history that is incapable of comprehension by an attentive mind really interested in public affairs'. 91 Addressing judicial exposition of the scope of Commonwealth and State legislative power, Garran noted that two formulations 'had been tried and found wanting, because when they were followed to the logical end they led off the track and threatened the federal principle'. The earlier of them, 'the non-interference formula of D'Emden v Pedder', 92 did so by 'veering too much towards State rights'. The later of them, 'the "natural meaning and inconsistency" formula of the Engineers' Case', 93 did so by 'veering too much towards central power'. Garran remarked that the High Court and the Privy Council had since 'been exploring in all directions in search of a complete selfadjusting formula'. Their search had 'not been altogether successful'. He nevertheless discerned in that search 'a definite trend', which he evidently welcomed, 'away from the
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Volume 46 _____________________________________________________________________________________ idea of finding a solution based on strict logical law, and towards the idea of taking into account political, social, and economic factors'. 94 '[F]ederalism', said Garran, is a 'compromise form of government' and the word 'federal' is 'a political word, with economic and social content'. 'Logic and compromise', he said, 'do not go well in double harness'. 95 The federal system in Australia, like everything else in the world, had changed since federation and would inevitably continue to change with changing conditions. Commonwealth legislative power had widened and would likely continue to widen, he predicted, although he saw more centralisation of legislative power as consistent with more decentralisation of the administration of centrally formulated legislation. 96 In addressing judicial exposition of the separation of Commonwealth legislative, executive and judicial power, Garran echoed the observations of James Bryce, 97 whom Garran knew personally. 98 Garran noted that Blackstone's adoption of Montesquieu's description of the English constitution of the 18 th century as preserving liberty by effecting a complete separation of the legislative, executive and judicial functions overlooked 'that even then, without the scratch of an official pen, there was growing up in England a constitutional practice based on close co-operation between parliament and executive which we now know as responsible government'. 99 When the framers of the United States Constitution 'took Montesquieu, backed as he was by the greatest English legal authority, for their spiritual guide', Garran noted, '[t]hey saw to it that, so far as was humanly possible, in their Constitution none of these three departments should be given any opportunity of conspiring with the others against liberty' and '[w]hen they "vested" the three powers in separate organs, they meant every word of it, exclusively and exhaustively'. 100 Garran contrasted the 'watchful Canadians next door' who astutely framed the British North America Act 1867 (Imp) to accommodate responsible government. The Canadians, Garran noted, eschewed the language of 'vesting', except for what he described as the statement of 'existing fact', that executive power 'continues and is vested in the Queen'. They also made 'no mention at all of "legislative power" or "judicial power"-merely the creation of a parliament with an attempt to list its scope, and a power to establish courts and define their jurisdiction'. 101 Of the framing of the Australian Constitution, Garran observed:
In 1891, when the first draft of the Australian Constitution took shape, with Griffith as its chief draftsman, the Canadian plan (apart from the list of federal subject-matters) was followed almost verbatim, with no mention of 'legislative power' or 'judicial power'. These words were introduced later in the 1897 Convention, but (as Griffith himself pointed out in Baxter v Ah Way) as a draftsman's neat arrangement, without any hint of further significance. 102 Garran went on to observe that, '[i]n the working of the Australian Constitution, it was many years before the strict separation of powers came to the fore', 103 through a process of judicial interpretation which began with the Wheat Case in 1915 104 and which culminated in his lifetime with the Boilermakers' Case in 1956. 105 Garran's own view was that the American-style doctrine of separation of powers was 'incompatible with the system of responsible government contemplated by the Constitution, and cannot be read into it'. He thought that 'for the independence of the judiciary under the Australian Constitution we need look no further than British tradition, backed up by the judges' security of tenure' and that 'the synthesis of social science with the law' which he saw then to be taking place was 'diminishing the isolation of jurisprudence'. 106 Garran was prescient. But, of course, he was not omniscient. He did not advert to the uniquely Australian entrenchment, by s 75(v) of the Constitution, of the original jurisdiction of the High Court in respect of matters in which constitutional writs or injunctions are sought against officers of the Commonwealth. He did not foretell the significance which that provision would come to have in our contemporary constitutional outlook. Whether he would have approved of developments in the High Court's ch III jurisprudence in the last 25 years, I cannot say. He would certainly have understood them, and he would have respected the process by which they have occurred. Garran's ideas were never so fixed that he thought he should fix them for others, much less for other generations. Rigidity was not in his nature. When the Constitution was still in its first 25 years, soon after the Engineers' Case, he had written:
Nothing is immune from the touches of time-not even a judgment of the final Court of Appeal; and the work which they began must be carried on from generation to generation. The judicial development of the Constitution is a continuous process, which has only just begun, and which will never end. 107 Addressing the judicial interpretation of s 92 of the Constitution in the pre-Cole v Whitfield 108 era in which he found himself, Garran expressed disappointment mixed with frustration. He said that he 'yield[ed] to no one in admiration of the achievements of the High Court and the Privy Council, but s 92 [was] not one of their successes-and unlike doctors, they cannot bury their failures'. 109 The words of s 92, said Garran, were: the words of politicians … on a political subject which politicians understood very well, and on which they were able to express themselves very clearly. They said that once the uniform ring-tariff had been drawn around the Australian Commonwealth, trade among the States must be absolutely free. They said that and meant it. … Mainly, of course, they needed assurance that no form of interstate duty would be imposed. That was already provided for by Section 90 [so far as the States were concerned] … But there was no express provision against border duties being imposed by the Federal Parliament. Besides, there
Volume 46 _____________________________________________________________________________________ are many other ways than duties by which freedom of trade among the States may be hampered; for instance, by direct prohibition, by pretended quarantine or health laws really directed to freedom of trade, and by other devices that might be thought of. 110 'For twenty years', said Garran, 'no one seemed to have any doubt about the general intent of the section', which he described as 'an absolute prohibition directed to [the] Commonwealth and to States against the re-erection of any form of barrier to interstate trade'. 'Then', he said, 'came the startling decision in McArthur's Case'. 111 Judicial interpretation of the section, in his lifetime, went downhill after that.
Garran would have been pleased with the reformulated approach taken to s 92 of the Constitution in 1988 in Cole v Whitfield. 112 The High Court's explanation in that case of the purpose and operation of s 92 was almost verbatim as Garran had described it. And Garran would have been especially pleased with the High Court's description of that approach involving a belated acknowledgment of the implications of the long-accepted perception that 'although the decision [whether an impugned law infringes s 92] was one for a court of law the problems were likely to be largely political, social or economic'. 113 Addressing the methodology of constitutional law more generally, Garran wrote in his memoir that he had no quarrel with the principle of 'the rule of law'. His concern was that constitutional adjudication needed to incorporate a view of the law which was 'less syllogistic' and 'more socio-legal' than 'British lawyers' of his day were used to. 114 He found constitutional wisdom in something his wife Hilda once said when, driving together near Canberra, he had overtaken a flock of ibis marching unperturbed down the middle of the road. Quoting Ovid, 115 to Garran's delight, Hilda had said 'Medio tutissimus ibis'-'The middle of the road will be your safest path'. 116 What was necessary, said Garran, was to 'keep in the middle of the road, and hold fast to the idea that constitutional law is not pure logic, it is logic plus politics'. 'However shocking [that] thought is', he said, 'we cannot get away from it'. 117 Anticipating the contemporary approach to constitutional interpretation ushered in with Cole v Whitfield, Garran said that it followed 'that we must overhaul some of our rules of constitutional interpretation':
There is a rule that we must look at the mischief to be cured and how it is intended to cure it, but there are other rules that discourage looking outside the text in search of a meaning. Therefore, the court often shuts its eyes to the best means of ascertaining mischief and remedy. I do not think this takes me as far as the modern American 'realist' idea of rationalized hunch behind the smooth logical form of common law judgment, but, taken together with an extension of the historical method in a certain type of federal question in constitutional law, it does seem to lean that way in that particular field. 118 In the concluding words of his memoir, which were evidently written at the very end of his life, Garran identified the contemporary task for constructive lawyers as being to tread a middle path both statesmanlike and practical. 119
V CONCLUSION
No description of Garran would be complete without reference to his love of poetry, his gift for languages, and his quiet religious faith. There is a particularly poetic passage in the King James translation of the biblical Book of Joel of which Garran was fond. The passage says that 'it shall come to pass' that 'your old men shall dream dreams, your young men shall see visions'. 120 Garran recorded in his memoir that he had always doubted, even as a young man, whether the translators had quite caught its meaning. 'Dreams', he then said, 'are surely more appropriate to early and visions to late lifewhen experience is added to intuition'. 121 The young Robert Garran did have a vision. In the concluding words of The Coming Commonwealth, he wrote in 1897:
But though the Constitution is much, it must not be supposed that it is everything. It is, in itself, merely the means to an end; merely the dead mechanical framework of national unity. The life and soul of the union must be breathed into it by the people themselves. When a Constitution has been framed and adopted, the work of Australian union will have been begun, not finished. The nation will be a nation, not of clauses and sub-clauses, but of men and women; and the destiny of Australia will rest with the Australian people rather than with the Australian Constitution. The work now in hand-the making of a Constitution-is great and important; but it is the beginning, not the end. 122 120 years later, we are fulfilling Garran's vision; we are living his dream. 119 Ibid 417. 120 Joel 2:28. 121 Garran, Prosper the Commonwealth, above n 7, x. 122 Garran, The Coming Commonwealth, above n 2020, 185.
